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Note
REVERSING A TREND:
AN AS-APPLIED APPROACH WEAKENS THE
BOERNE CONGRUENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY TEST
In Tennessee v. Lane,1 the United States Supreme Court consid-
ered whether Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA) 2 properly abrogated state sovereign immunity pursuant to Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.' The Court held that Congress
properly abrogated sovereign immunity pursuant to the enforcement
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment when it enacted Title II of
the ADA, as applied to cases implicating the fundamental right of ac-
cess to the courts.4 The Court based its decision on the history of
discrimination by the states documented by Congress.5 The Lane
Court's as-applied approach deviates substantially from the proper ap-
plication of the congruence and proportionality test first enunciated
by the Court in City of Boerne v. Flores.6 None of the Court's post-Boerne
cases supports an as-applied approach to reviewing legislation enacted
pursuant to Congress's powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.7 The Lane Court's novel as-applied approach under-
mines the restrictions placed on Congress's Section 5 authority by a
vigorous application of the congruence and proportionality test.8 As a
result of the decision in Lane, the protections afforded states through
the Eleventh Amendment may be significantly weakened.9
1. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2000). Congress intended Title II to prevent discrimi-
nation against the disabled in any public service, program, or activity provided by a public
entity. Id. §§ 12131-12134.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
4. Lane, 541 U.S. at 532-34.
5. Id.
6. 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997). Boerne requires that any legislation passed pursuant to
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment be a congruent and proportional response to the
identified harm. Id.; see infra notes 230-245 and accompanying text.
7. See infta notes 246-278 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 279-289 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 290-300 and accompanying text.
910
TENNESSEE V. LANE
I. THE CASE
Both George Lane and Beverly Jones are paraplegics who rely on
wheelchairs for mobility.' In 1996, the first respondent, Lane, went
to Tennessee's Polk County Courthouse to face two misdemeanor
charges.1 The courtroom in which Lane needed to appear was on
the second floor of a building that had no elevator.1 2 Lane was forced
to crawl up two flights of stairs to get to the courtroom. 13 At his subse-
quent appearance, Lane refused to crawl up the stairs, and he refused
the offer of two court officers to carry him up the stairs. 4 Conse-
quently, state officers arrested and jailed Lane for failure to appear in
court on criminal charges.
15
During subsequent court proceedings, Lane waited on the first
floor of the courthouse while his attorney represented him in the sec-
ond-floor courtroom. 6 His attorney periodically left the courtroom
to relay messages concerning his defense.1 7 Finally, at Lane's arraign-
ment, his attorney filed a motion for a continuance to stay the pro-
ceedings until the courthouse facilities were modified to conform to
the ADA's requirements regarding access for the disabled.' 8 The
court denied Lane's motion and scheduled the matter for trial.' 9 In
April of 1997, Lane filed an application for extraordinary appeal con-
testing the denial of the motion for a continuance, which the Tennes-
see Court of Criminal Appeals denied.2" In June of 1997, Lane filed
another extraordinary appeal application with the Supreme Court of
the State of Tennessee, which the court denied in September of
1997.21 Following the unsuccessful appeal, Tennessee Circuit Court
Judge Carroll Ross issued an order in December of 1997 staying all
criminal proceedings in the Polk County Courthouse pending the in-
stallation of an ADA compliant elevator.22 Upon completion of the
10. Lane, 541 U.S. at 513.
11. Brief for the United States at 4, Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (No. 02-
1667).
12. Lane, 541 U.S. at 513.
13. Id. at 513-14.
14. Id. at 514.
15. Id.
16. Brief of Petitioner at 7, Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (No. 02-1667).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 7-8.
19. Id. at 8.
20. Id.
21. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at App. 16, Tennessee v. Lane, 514 U.S. 509 (2004)
(No. 02-1667).
22. Brief of Petitioner at 8, Lane (No. 02-1667).
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elevator installation in June of 1998, the state continued its prosecu-
tion of Lane for the two misdemeanor charges pending against him.2"
The second respondent was Beverly Jones, a certified court re-
porter whose practice serves the Polk County Courthouse as well as
other courthouses in Tennessee.24 Jones alleged that she lost work
due to the failure of many Tennessee courthouses to comply with the
accessibility requirements of the ADA.25
Lane and Jones jointly brought suit against the State of Tennes-
see and several Tennessee counties on August 10, 1998 in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee.2 6 They al-
leged past and ongoing violations of Title II of the ADA and its imple-
menting regulations.27 Lane and Jones sought monetary damages for
humiliation and embarrassment as well as equitable relief.2" Tennes-
see moved to dismiss the suit on the grounds that the Eleventh
Amendment protects states from private suits for monetary damages
filed pursuant to Title I1.29 The district court denied the motion with-
out issuing an opinion, and Tennessee appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.30 The Sixth Circuit allowed
the United States to intervene to defend Title II's abrogation of the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.3'
On April 28, 2000, the Sixth Circuit issued an order holding the
case in abeyance until the resolution of Board of Trustees of the University
of Alabama v. Garrett2 by the United States Supreme Court.33 In Gar-
rett, the Court considered whether the Eleventh Amendment prohibits
suits filed directly against state governments for violations of Title I of
the ADA, and held that such suits are prohibited.34 Based on the Su-
preme Court's holding in Garrett and on the Sixth Circuit's subse-
quent ruling in Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas,35
which found that the ADA's abrogation of sovereign immunity was
valid for claims arising out of the Due Process Clause but not for
23. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at App. 17, Lane (No. 02-1667).
24. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 514 (2004).
25. Id.
26. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at App. 12, Lane (No. 02-1667).
27. Lane, 541 U.S. at 513.
28. Brief of Petitioner at 9, Lane (No. 02-1667). Additionally, Jones sought damages
for lost income. Id.
29. Lane, 541 U.S. at 514.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
33. Lane, 541 U.S. at 514.
34. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360.
35. 276 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2002).
[VOL. 64:910
TENNESSEE V. LANE
claims arising out of the Equal Protection Clause, 6 a panel of the
Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Tennessee's mo-
tion to dismiss.3 7 The Sixth Circuit held that because the allegations
made by Lane and Jones implicated the Due Process Clause, their
claims could proceed. 8
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the Due Process Clause protects
the right of access to the courts.3 9 Furthermore, the court stated that
Congress determined that physical barriers in government court-
houses had denied disabled people the opportunity "to access vital
services and to exercise fundamental rights guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause" prior to the enactment of Title II of the ADA.4" Con-
sequently, the panel concluded that Congress validly enacted Title II
to protect disabled individuals' constitutional rights of access to
courts.4 ' Nevertheless, due to the fact that Tennessee contested
whether the allegations made by Lane and Jones amounted to due
process violations, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case for further
proceedings.42 The State appealed, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to decide whether Title II of the ADA exceeded Congress's
authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate
state sovereign immunity.
43
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In 1990, Congress passed the ADA, which abrogated state sover-
eign immunity in an attempt to eliminate what Congress perceived as
societal discrimination against the disabled.44 Although states main-
tained sovereign immunity prior to the ratification of the Constitu-
tion,4" the principles of state sovereign immunity only became actual
constitutional doctrine with the ratification of the Eleventh Amend-
36. Id. at 811.
37. Lane, 541 U.S. at 515.
38. Id Tennessee filed a petition for rehearing claiming that Popovich should not con-
trol because the initial complaint filed by Lane and Jones did not allege any due process
violations. Id. The Sixth Circuit issued an amended opinion affirming the district court's
denial of Tennessee's motion to dismiss and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 513, 515.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (b)(1), (b)(4); see infta notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
45. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999).
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ment.4 6 It is now firmly established that the state sovereign immunity
embodied in the Eleventh Amendment may be abrogated only
through congressional legislation enacted to enforce the protections
of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 7 Subsequent to the enactment of the
ADA, the Court created the congruence and proportionality test in
Boerne, in order to determine whether congressional legislation en-
acted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment remedied and de-
terred actual constitutional violations committed by the states or
impermissibly created new obligations for the states by redefining the
substance of the Fourteenth Amendment.4" The Court's recent appli-
cation of the congruence and proportionality test has narrowed Con-
gress's ability to enact valid legislation under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.4 9 The judicial preference for reviewing leg-
islation as applied to the facts of any one particular case has recently
been applied to the congruence and proportionality test.50
A. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
In 1990, Congress passed the ADA to eliminate discrimination
against individuals with disabilities. 5' The ADA prevents discrimina-
tion against the disabled in three areas of public life. Title I prohibits
discrimination in the workplace,5 2 while Title II forbids discrimination
against the disabled in the operation of public services, programs, and
activities. 5 1 In addition, Title III prevents discrimination in public ac-
commodations.5 4 Congress passed the ADA after finding that individ-
uals with disabilities had been subjected to decades of discrimination
based on intrinsic characteristics beyond their control.5 5 Specifically,
Congress intended the ADA to create a "clear and comprehensive na-
tional mandate" to eliminate discrimination against the disabled.56
46. See id. at 727-30 (discussing the Court's interpretation of the Eleventh Amend-
ment); infra notes 61-84 and accompanying text.
47. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1976) (noting Congress's authority to
invade the states' Eleventh Amendment protections through valid legislation passed pursu-
ant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); infra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
48. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530-32 (1997); see infta notes 93-111 and
accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 112-152 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 153-166 and accompanying text.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
52. Id. §§ 12111-12117. The Court struck down Title I's provision abrogating state sov-
ereign immunity in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360
(2001).
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165.
54. Id. §§ 12181-12189.
55. Id. § 12101 (a) (7).
56. Id. § 12101(b)(1).
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Title II of the ADA states that "no qualified individual with a disa-
bility shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participa-
tion in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities
of a public entity."57 A "public entity" includes state and local govern-
ments as well as all instrumentalities of any state or local govern-
ment.58 Through the express terms of the ADA, moreover, Congress
indicated its intention to abrogate state sovereign immunity.59 Conse-
quently, the ADA requires states to make reasonable modifications to
the services they provide in order to accommodate individuals with
disabilities, and it subjects to liability those states that fail to take such
action.6"
B. State Sovereign Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution
states that " [t] he Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prose-
cuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."6" The Court's longstand-
ing interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment prohibits a state's own
citizens, or citizens of another state or foreign country, from filing suit
in federal court against a state government.
6 2
In 1996, the Court reaffirmed this principle by holding that Con-
gress lacked the authority under Article I of the United States Consti-
tution 6 3  to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity from suits
commenced or prosecuted in federal courts.6 4 The Court issued this
57. Id. § 12132. The statute defines a "qualified individual" as:
an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to
rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or
transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the
essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in
programs or activities provided by a public entity.
Id. § 12131(2).
58. Id. § 12131 (1).
59. Id. § 12202. The ADA states: "A State shall not be immune under the eleventh
amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State
court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter." Id.
60. Id. § 12131.
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
62. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 727-30 (1999) (noting that since the Court's deci-
sion in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890), the Eleventh Amendment has afforded the
states sovereign immunity from private suits for monetary damages).
63. U.S. CONST. art. I. Article I sets forth the powers held by the legislative branch of
the federal government. Id.
64. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996). In Seminole Tribe, the
Court overruled a plurality decision, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989),
which allowed Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to Article I powers.
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holding in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, a case filed by an Indian
tribe against the State of Florida for alleged violations of the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act (the Gaming Act).65 Congress passed the
Gaming Act 6 pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause 6 7 to provide a
legal basis for the operation and regulation of gaming by Indian
Tribes.68 According to the Court, the Gaming Act passed the thresh-
old requirement that Congress unequivocally state its intent to abro-
gate state sovereign immunity.69 However, the Court affirmed the
court of appeals's holding that the case should be dismissed, and
noted the longstanding principle that the Eleventh Amendment re-
stricts the Article III jurisdiction of the judiciary by preventing private
suits against state governments for monetary damages.7y The Court
thus held that Congress did not have power under Article I to abro-
gate the prohibition placed on the federal courts by the Eleventh
Amendment.7 1 In coming to this conclusion, the Court pointed out
that Congress has no authority to expand the Article IIIjurisdiction of
the judiciary past the boundaries set by the Constitution.7 2 Because
the Eleventh Amendment set a constitutional limit on Article IIIjuris-
diction, the Court determined that Congress could not legislatively
expand that jurisdiction beyond those restrictions using Article I pow-
ers alone.7 3
Moreover, in Alden v. Maine, the Supreme Court recognized that
sovereign immunity prohibits the federal government from authoriz-
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59-66. The majority in Seminole Tribe reiterated that the Eleventh
Amendment restricted the jurisdiction of the judiciary under Article III, which sets forth
the judicial power. Id. at 72-73. Consequently, the Eleventh Amendment essentially fore-
closed the courts as an avenue of relief for private citizens seeking monetary damages
against any sovereign. Id. In light of the fact that the Eleventh Amendment was ratified
years after the ratification of Article I of the Constitution, the Seminole Tribe majority deter-
mined that Congress could not use its Article I powers to abrogate the restrictions placed
on the jurisdiction of the courts through the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment. Id
65. 517 U.S. at 48. The Gaming Act required state governments to negotiate in good
faith any tribal-state gambling compact for certain gaming activities. Id. at 52. The Semi-
nole Tribe filed suit in federal court alleging that the government of Florida failed to enter
into any negotiations to include certain gaming activities in a tribal-state compact, and thus
violated the good faith negotiation clause of the Gaming Act. Id Florida filed a motion to
dismiss, claiming its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity barred the action alto-
gether. Id.
66. 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000).
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
68. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 48.
69. Id. at 56-57.
70. Id, at 64-65.
71. Id. at 64-66.
72. Id. at 65.
73. Id. at 66.
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ing suits against state governments filed in a state court where the
state has not consented to such suit. 74 In Alden, the Court dismissed a
suit filed by state probation officers against the State of Maine that
alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 75 The Court stated
that giving Congress unlimited authority to abrogate state sovereign
immunity would pose a severe danger to the state's fiscal resources.76
In addition, the Court concluded that allowing the federal govern-
ment to authorize suits against a state government places a strain on
the state's ability to govern according to the will of its people. 7 The
Court reasoned that if the states are to maintain their representative
function, then the difficult decisions involving the distribution of lim-
ited fiscal resources must be made through the legislative branch es-
tablished by each state, and not through federal intervention
exploited by the citizenry.7 8
The sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment
is not simply an immunity from liability, but rather jurisdictional im-
munity from suit altogether. In 1993, the Court reaffirmed that the
purpose of the Eleventh Amendment is "to prevent the indignity of
subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the
[insistence] of private parties. '79 In Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Au-
thority v. Metcalf & Eddy, a government instrumentality faced a suit by a
private business for breach of contract and damage to its business rep-
utation." The district court denied the state agency's claim of sover-
eign immunity, and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
reversed, dismissing the subsequent appeal for lack of jurisdiction.8
The Supreme Court determined that a state entity may immediately
appeal the denial of a motion for Eleventh Amendment immunity
under the collateral order doctrine.82 The Court reasoned that the
74. 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999).
75. Id. at 711-12. Initially, the petitioners filed the claim in federal court; however,
once the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Seminole Tribe, the district court dismissed
the action on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Id. at 712. Thereafter, the petitioners filed
their claims in state court. Id.
76. Id. at 749-50.
77. Id. at 750-51.
78. Id.
79. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)
(quoting In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)).
80. Id. at 141.
81. Id. at 142. The First Circuit determined that binding precedent prohibited states
and their agencies from immediately appealing a claim for Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity. Id.
82. Id. at 147. The collateral order doctrine allows a party to immediately appeal a
ruling that is not complete or final when an important right is at stake that is collateral to,
and independent from, the cause of action. Id at 14243.
91720051
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Eleventh Amendment is intended to protect the states from suit alto-
gether, not simply liability for damages.8 3 Furthermore, the Court
concluded that much of the value of state sovereign immunity itself is
lost if a suit proceeds far past the initial stages of litigation. 4
C. Congressional Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity
Though the Supreme Court continues to recognize the impor-
tance of sovereign immunity, the Court has allowed Congress to abro-
gate sovereign immunity in discrete instances in order to remedy and
deter actual violations of Fourteenth Amendment rights by the states.
Congress maintains the authority to protect the substantive guaran-
tees of the Fourteenth Amendment from state interference through
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment-the enforcement provi-
sion-which states that "Congress shall have power to enforce, by ap-
propriate legislation, the provisions of this article. 8s 5 In Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, the Court found in the enforcement provision a shift in the
relationship between the federal and state governments: the Four-
teenth Amendment expanded the authority of the federal govern-
ment at the expense of state autonomy.8 6 Because of this shift, the
Fitzpatrick Court reasoned that the federal government could invade
the sovereignty guaranteed to the states by the Eleventh Amendment
through "appropriate legislation," in order to protect the substantive
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment from state interference.8 7
Specifically, the Fitzpatrick Court held that Congress had the authority
to allow private suits for monetary damages against states or state offi-
cials in order to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment.88
In Fitzpatrick, male employees of the State of Connecticut brought
suit against the state government for alleged violations of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.89 The Court concluded that Title VII was
a valid exercise of Congress's Section 5 enforcement power.9 0 The
Court noted that no previous cases had dealt with the question of the
relationship between the Eleventh Amendment and Congress's Sec-
tion 5 enforcement power, but concluded that state sovereign immu-
83. Id. at 144.
84. Id.
85. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
86. 427 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1976).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 456.
89. Id. at 448. The plaintiffs alleged that certain portions of Connecticut's retirement
plan discriminated against them because of their gender, in violation of Title VII. Id.
90. Id. at 456-57.
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nity as embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is "necessarily limited
by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."" Congress could then abrogate state sovereign immunity by
legislation under Section 5 whenever necessary to enforce the obliga-
tions placed on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
9 2
D. Narrowing the Scope of Congress's Power: Congruence and
Proportionality
Since Fitzpatrick, the Supreme Court has limited Congress's ability
to abrogate sovereign immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In Boerne, the Supreme Court struck down the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)" 3 because it exceeded Con-
gress's Section 5 enforcement powers. 4 Boerne involved a challenge
to the denial of a church building permit by local zoning authorities
under RFRA." In passing RFRA, Congress prohibited state govern-
ments from enforcing ostensibly neutral laws if such enforcement re-
sulted in a substantial burden on religious exercise unless that burden
furthered a compelling government interest and the law was the least
restrictive means of achieving that interest.96
The Boerne Court acknowledged Congress's prophylactic power
under the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit constitutional conduct
by the states if Congress determined that the prohibition was neces-
sary to deter or remedy actual Fourteenth Amendment violations by
the states.97 The Court, however, went on to hold that congressional
power to enact prophylactic legislation9" under Section 5 of the Four-
91. Id. at 456.
92. Id.
93. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994). Congress passed RFRA in response to the
Supreme Court's ruling in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997). In Smith, the Court upheld a generally applica-
ble statute that criminalized the use of peyote and thereby prevented a group of Native
Americans, who used peyote for religious purposes, from receiving unemployment benefits
after they lost their jobs for failing a drug test. Smith, 494 U.S. at 872.
94. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
95. Id. at 511.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a).
97. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518. As an example, the Boerne Court pointed to a series of
literacy tests that many states required their citizens to take in order to vote, and which
Congress prohibited through legislation passed pursuant to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. Id. According to the Boerne Court, the literacy tests were not unconstitu-
tional standing alone, but Congress could prohibit them because doing so was necessary to
remedy and deter the constitutional violations documented by Congress. Id.
98. Id. at 518-19. As set forth by the Court, valid prophylactic legislation seeks to rem-
edy past violations of the Fourteenth Amendment by the states and to prevent future ones.
Id. at 519. The remedial nature of legislation ceases when Congress attempts to change the
substantive protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
2005]
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teenth Amendment is limited. 9 The Court recognized that the Con-
stitution creates a defined and limited federal government and
consequently the judiciary must ensure that legislative acts are within
the limited powers granted by the Constitution.1"' The Court noted
that the history and judicial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment shows that, even with its remedial powers, Congress does not
have the authority to create through legislation new substantive con-
stitutional rights. 1 ' The Court, therefore, articulated a test in Boerne
to determine whether congressional legislation enacted pursuant to
the Fourteenth Amendment only protects recognized rights, rather
than creating new ones.10 2 In order to pass the Boerne test, legislation
enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment needs
to exhibit a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
remedied or prevented and the means chosen to achieve that end.'0 3
Under the congruence and proportionality test, a court must ex-
amine congressional legislation to first determine what constitutional
violations Congress intended to remedy.10 4 Next, a court must decide
whether the means Congress chose to remedy the identified constitu-
tional violations are congruent and proportional to the unconstitu-
tional conduct.10 5
The Court applied the congruence and proportionality test in
Boerne and determined that RFRA was "so out of proportion" to the
constitutional wrong that it purported to remedy that it was clearly an
attempt to change the substantive law.10 6 Prior to the passage of
RFRA, the Court had interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to allow
generally applicable laws that are facially neutral toward religion to
stand even if those laws indirectly infringed on the free exercise of
religion.10 7 Under RFRA, those same laws could stand only if the gov-
ernment showed a compelling government interest and that those
laws were the least restrictive means of achieving the government's
interest.108 Such a drastic change demonstrated "a lack of proportion-
ality or congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate
99. Id.
100. Id. at 516 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803)).
101. Id. at 520-24 (describing how the Fourteenth Amendment in its original form was
defeated out of fear that it would end up delegating full authority to Congress to create
new rights).
102. Id. at 519-20.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 518.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 532.
107. Id. at 534.
108. Id. at 533-34.
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end to be achieved."' 0 9 While the Court noted that prophylactic legis-
lation was appropriate under certain circumstances, it found that Con-
gress did not point to any record of constitutional violations that
justified a measure as sweeping and stringent as RFRA." It also em-
phasized the dissimilarities between RFRA and previous valid exercises
of Congress's Section 5 authority, which were more focused on actual
constitutional violations and more limited in duration and scope.
11 1
E. Applying the Congruence and Proportionality Test
The Court has continued to apply the test articulated in Boerne to
narrow Congress's Section 5 authority. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,' 12 a case filed against
an agency of the Florida government for patent infringement, the
Court examined whether the Patent and Plant Variety Protection
Remedy Clarification Act (the Patent Remedy Act) ,13 which amended
federal patent laws, created a private right of action for monetary
damages against the state government." 4 College Savings Bank sued
Florida Prepaid alleging that Florida Prepaid violated its patent on
College Savings Bank's financing methodology, which guaranteed its
customers sufficient funds to finance a college education.
511 5 The
Court first determined that in the Patent Remedy Act Congress clearly
expressed its intention to abrogate the sovereign immunity of the
states.'16 The Court then applied the Boerne test to determine
whether Congress acted within its authority under the Fourteenth
Amendment to abrogate state sovereign immunity.
1 7
According to the Court, the conduct that Congress attempted to
prohibit was unconstitutional patent infringement on the part of the
states, where the states claimed sovereign immunity and offered no
compensation to the patent owners for their infringement."' How-
ever, the Court determined that Congress failed to identify a pattern
109. Id. at 533.
110. Id. at 530-33.
111. Id.
112. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
113. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (2000).
114. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 630-31.
115. Id. at 631.
116. Id. at 635. The Patent Remedy Act stated, "Any State ... shall not be immune,
under the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any
other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court by any person .. .for
infringement of a patent under section 271, or for any other violation under this title." 35
U.S.C. § 296(a).
117. Fa. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 637-40.
118. Id. at 640.
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of unconstitutional state patent infringement and had collected little
evidence of such activity. 119 Moreover, the Court found that Con-
gress's response to the alleged constitutional violations swept too
broadly. Congress did not confine the Patent Remedy Act to cover
specific patent infringements that were most likely associated with
constitutional violations, but had rather attempted "to provide a uni-
form remedy for patent infringement and to place States on the same
footing as private parties under that regime."120 Consequently, the
Court held that the Patent Remedy Act was not a valid exercise of
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus did
not authorize suits against state governments.' 2 '
The Court returned to the Boerne analysis in its decision in Kimel
v. Florida Board of Regents.122 Kimelarose from various consolidated age
discrimination claims against universities in Florida and Alabama, as
well as a correctional facility in Florida.123  The Court examined
whether Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity when it
passed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). 124
Based on the 1974 amendments to the ADEA, the Court determined
that Congress unequivocally intended the ADEA, as amended, to al-
low for suits against state employers. 125
In analyzing the ADEA under Boerne, the Kimel Court determined
that the burdens the ADEA imposed on state and local governments
were disproportionate to any possible state unconstitutional behavior
targeted by the Act. 126 The Court noted that the Equal Protection
Clause allows states and local governments to discriminate based on
age when making employment decisions where such discrimination is
rationally related to a legitimate government interest. 127 The ADEA
prevented all discrimination based on an individual's age when mak-
119. Id.
120. Id. at 647-48. For instance, the Court noted that Congress could have restricted the
Patent Remedy Act to instances where a state refused to offer any remedy for patent in-
fringement, and thus deprived its citizen-patentees of property without due process of law.
Id. According to the Court, Congress could have additionally limited the remedy to non-
negligent patent infringements or infringements committed pursuant to state policy. Id.
121. Id.
122. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
123. Id. at 69-71.
124. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000); Kime 528 U.S. at 66-67.
125. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 75-76. Specifically, § 216(b) of the ADEA authorizes employee
suits against states "in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction." 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b).
126. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83.
127. Id.
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ing employment decisions. 128 Consequently, the Court concluded
that the requirements of the ADEA were analogous to the require-
ments of equal protection cases applying heightened scrutiny. 129 The
Court examined the history of the ADEA to see if Congress docu-
mented a pattern of irrational age discrimination by the states that
would likely fail constitutional scrutiny under the Court's Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection analysis."' 0 In its analysis of the legisla-
tive history, the Court found that Congress failed to pinpoint any pat-
tern of unconstitutional discrimination by the states that would
support the broad prophylactic prohibition against age discrimination
in the ADEA."'3 As a result, the Court held that the ADEA exceeded
the scope of Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 132
In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, the Court
applied the Boerne test to determine whether congressional abrogation
of sovereign immunity in Title I of the ADA was a valid use of Con-
gress's Section 5 power.1 33 Garrett involved state employees who filed
claims for monetary damages against entities of the state government
and alleged that the state discriminated against them in their employ-
ment due to their disabilities, in violation of Title I of the ADA.'3 4 In
applying the Boerne analysis, the Court noted that under the Equal
Protection Clause, discrimination by the states against the disabled is
subject to rational basis scrutiny.135 This fact required Congress to
document a pattern of irrational discrimination by the states that
would likely violate the constitution before legislation passed pursuant
to the enforcement provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment would
be warranted.13 6 The Court found that the legislative record com-
piled by Congress failed to document a widespread pattern of uncon-
128. Id. This rule is subject to narrow exceptions, but the standards to satisfy the excep-
tions are more stringent than the rational basis test. Id. at 86-88.
129. Id. at 87-88.
130. Id. at 88.
131. Id. at 88-91.
132. Id. at 86.
133. 531 U.S. 356, 372 (2001).
134. Id. at 360, 362-63. Title I of the ADA prohibits employers, including state govern-
ments, from discriminating against the disabled in employment related decisions. 42
U.S.C. § 12112.
135. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366.
136. Id. at 368. The Court noted that Title I of the ADA marked a substantial expansion
of rights for individuals with disabilities beyond that found in the Constitution itself. Id. at
372. The ADA's requirement that reasonable accommodations need to be taken for the
disabled was pinpointed as evidence of this expansion of rights. Id.
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stitutional employment discrimination by the states.13 7 Additionally,
the majority stated that even if congressional documentation was
enough to conclude that states were engaged in a widespread pattern
of constitutional violations, the remedy that Congress chose failed the
congruence and proportionality test.1 3' According to the Court, the
ADA places a duty on employers that far exceeds what the Constitu-
tion requires under the Equal Protection Clause. 139 Therefore, up-
holding Title I as valid Section 5 enforcement legislation would allow
Congress to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 ° Accordingly, the
Court held that Congress had not validly abrogated the states' sover-
eign immunity, and suits against state governments to recover mone-
tary damages for violations of Title I of the ADA were barred.' 4 '
In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,'42 the Supreme
Court examined whether former employees of the Nevada Depart-
ment of Human Resources could recover monetary damages against
the state for alleged violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA).14 The FMIA allows certain employees to take up to twelve
weeks of unpaid leave for a number of reasons, including illness of a
spouse, child, or parent.'44 The Court concluded that the FMLA was
appropriate Section 5 legislation that enforced the constitutional
right against sex discrimination.' 45 The Court found that Congress
intended the FMLA to protect individuals from gender-based discrimi-
nation in the workplace. 4 6 In examining the FMLA, the Court found
that classifications based on gender must undergo heightened scru-
tiny by the courts.'4 7 According to the Court, this heightened scrutiny
made it more likely that incidents of discrimination documented by
Congress amounted to constitutional violations that required reme-
dial action. 48
The Court found that the legislative record behind the FMLA
documented an extensive history of sex discrimination by the states in
137. Id. at 368. After excluding instances of discrimination committed by local govern-
ments, which are not protected by sovereign immunity, the congressional record only re-
flected six instances of state discrimination. Id. at 369.
138. Id. at 372.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 374.
141. Id.
142. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
143. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000); Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 725.
144. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1).
145. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735.
146. Id. at 728.
147. Id. at 728-29.
148. Id. at 736.
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the administration of leave benefits.14 The majority determined that
the adopted means by Congress satisfied the congruence and propor-
tionality requirement set forth in Boerne1 5 ° Congress had narrowly
targeted the FMLA to address the relationship between work and fam-
ily, which is precisely the area where Congress documented a signifi-
cant amount of discrimination on the part of the states.
151
Accordingly, the Court held that Congress validly abrogated the
states' sovereign immunity, creating a private right of action for mone-
tary damages in federal court against state governments allegedly vio-
lating the FMLA.152
F. The Judicial Preference for Reviewing Legislation As Applied
In 1960, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Raines,15 reviewed
a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of
1957 (the 1957 Act).154 Congress passed the 1957 Act to enforce the
Fifteenth Amendment's voting rights protections.1 55 In Raines, the
United States government sought an injunction against officials of the
State of Georgia who allegedly took actions preventing African Ameri-
cans from registering to vote, in violation of the 1957 Act. 156 The dis-
trict court struck down the 1957 Act as unconstitutional because it
allowed the federal government to enjoin purely private conduct, in
violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.1 57 The Supreme Court re-
versed and upheld the 1957 Act, noting that the federal government
brought the case directly against state officials, which the Fifteenth
Amendment allows, and did not file an action against private citi-
zens. 5' Thus, the Court upheld the 1957 Act as applied to the facts of
Raines and refused to perform a broader substantive review of the
1957 Act. 159
149. Id. at 735. The Court pointed to instances where courts allowed states to discrimi-
nate based on gender in employment decisions. Id, at 729.
150. Id. at 737.
151. Id. at 738. Congress documented instances where women received substantially
more leave benefits than men, and the FMLA allowed for twelve weeks of unpaid leave for
all employees who had been with the employer for more than a year and exempted those
individuals in high-ranking or sensitive positions. Md at 731, 739.
152. Id. at 725.
153. 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2000); Raines, 362 U.S. at 20.
155. Raines, 362 U.S. at 19-20.
156. Id. at 19.
157. Id. at 20.
158. Id. at 26.
159. Id.
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While not citing Raines directly, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit used an as-applied approach in 2002 when
it addressed the constitutionality of Title II of the ADA. 1 60 In Popovich
v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, the Sixth Circuit examined
whether the abrogation of sovereign immunity in Title II of the ADA
was constitutional. 6' In Popovich, a hearing-impaired parent brought
both an equal protection and due process claim under Title II against
a state court for failing to provide him sufficient hearing assistance in
his child custody case. 16 2
The Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, relied on Garrett and deter-
mined that Title II of the ADA did not properly abrogate the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity based on equal protection principles,
because Title II redefined the rights of the disabled under the Equal
Protection Clause.1 63 The court, however, went on to hold that the
Eleventh Amendment does not bar private suits for monetary dam-
ages against the states based on violations of Title II of the ADA when
the basis of such suits implicate principles embodied in the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 16 4 In particular, the court
determined that Title II was appropriate Section 5 legislation as ap-
plied to the significant due process rights of a hearing-impaired par-
ent at a child custody proceeding, and thus abrogation of sovereign
immunity was appropriate. 165 Consequently, the court allowed the
plaintiff's suit to continue. 1 66
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Tennessee v. Lane, the United States Supreme Court held that
Title II of the ADA, as applied to cases in which the fundamental right
of access to courts is implicated, constitutes a valid exercise of Con-
gress's authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
abrogate state sovereign immunity.167 Writing for the Court, Justice
160. Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808, 811 (6th Cir.
2002).
161. Id. at 811.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 812.
164. Id. at 815.
165. Id. at 815-16.
166. Id. at 816.
167. 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004).
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Stevens 168 quickly concluded that Congress expressly intended to ab-
rogate state sovereign immunity in Title II of the ADA.
1 6 9
The Court detailed the deliberations that Congress completed
prior to enacting Title 11.17' Then the Court examined the constitu-
tional rights Congress attempted to protect by enacting Title 11.17 1 Ac-
cording to the Court, Title II sought to enforce the equal protection
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment in the same manner as Ti-
tle 1.172 However, the Lane Court distinguished Title II from Title I by
pointing out that Title II sought to enforce five additional constitu-
tional rights that receive a more stringent review by the courts, some
of which implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.1 73 According to the Court, the legislative history of the ADA
indicated that Congress enacted Title II in direct response to the une-
qual treatment that the disabled systematically received in the admin-
istration of state services and programs affecting the fundamental
rights of every citizen. 174 The Court detailed the findings that Con-
gress made before passing the ADA and specifically noted that a re-
port before Congress documented that a substantial number of public
168. Id. at 513. Justices O'Connor, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer joined in Justice Ste-
vens's opinion. Id.
169. Id. at 518. The statute states, "[a] State shall not be immune under the eleventh
amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State
court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter." 42 U.S.C. § 12202.
170. Lane, 541 U.S. at 516-17.
171. Id. at 522-23.
172. Id. The Court, striking down Tide I of the ADA as unconstitutional in Garrett,
noted that classifications based on disability violate the Fourteenth Amendment if "they
lack a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose." Id. at 521-22.
173. Id. at 523. First, the Court identified the right of access to the courts protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Second, it recognized the
right of criminal defendants to be present at all stages of a criminal trial where absence
would frustrate the fairness of the proceedings-a right protected by both the Due Process
Clause and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. I. Third, the Court
noted the Due Process Clause requirement that states remove obstacles to the full partici-
pation by certain civil litigants in judicial proceedings. Id. Fourth, the Court stated that
the Sixth Amendment guarantees ajury representing a fair cross section of the community
to criminal defendants. Id. Finally, the Court noted that the First Amendment secures a
right for the public to have access to criminal proceedings. Id.
174. Id. at 524. To support this contention, the Court identified state laws targeting the
disabled for discrimination, including laws disqualifying "idiots" from voting, and laws
preventing persons with disabilities from marrying or serving on juries. Id. The Court
then highlighted Supreme Court cases that reflected state animus towards the disabled in
such instances as unjustified commitment, state mental hospitals abusing and neglecting
patients, and irrational discrimination in zoning decisions. Id. at 524-25. As further evi-
dence of state discrimination against the disabled, the Court listed certain decisions of
lower courts that documented discrimination in public services, programs, and activities
administered by the states. Id. at 525 nn.11-14.
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services and programs housed in state buildings were inaccessible to
the disabled.175
According to the Court, the record before Congress when it en-
acted Title II far exceeded the congressional record of gender dis-
crimination compiled prior to the enactment of the Family and
Medical Leave Act, which the Court upheld in Hibbs.76 The majority
noted that the decision in Hibbs hinged on the fact that gender dis-
crimination is subject to a heightened level of scrutiny, which makes it
more likely that any documentation gathered by Congress would show
a pattern of state constitutional violations. 177 Because many of the
rights protected by Title II demand a similar or higher level of scru-
tiny than gender discrimination, the Court determined that the con-
gressional record relied upon by Congress was more than enough to
justify prophylactic measures. 1
71
Lastly, the Court examined whether Title II was a valid congres-
sional response to the well-documented history and pattern of une-
qual treatment against the disabled. 179  The Court stated that
Congress attempted to enforce numerous constitutional guarantees
when it enacted Title II.1s° However, in examining the claims of Lane
and Jones, the Court focused on the narrow issue presented by the
facts of the case, defining the issue as whether Congress had the au-
thority under its Section 5 powers to enforce the constitutional right
of access to the courts.1 81 The Court found that Title II is "unques-
tionably" appropriate legislation "as applied" to allegations that cer-
tain judicial proceedings and processes are inaccessible. 182
175. Id. at 526. The Court also pointed out that Congress heard testimony from individ-
uals with disabilities who described their inability to access courthouses. Id. at 527. More-
over, the report the Court relied on contained instances of discrimination by the states and
their political subdivisions against the disabled. Id. ChiefJustice Rehnquist disagreed with
the majority including examples of discrimination committed by the political subdivisions
of a state when determining whether abrogation of sovereign immunity is appropriate,
given the fact that those political subdivisions are not protected by sovereign immunity. Id.
at 542 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 528-29; Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
177. Lane, 541 U.S. at 528-29.
178. Id. at 529.
179. Id. at 530.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 530-31. The Court used Garrett to support the proposition that a court can
break a law down into its component parts to review it under the Boerne test. Id. at 531
n.18. Additionally, the Court cited United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960), to support
this manner of review. Lane, 541 U.S. at 531 n.19.
182. Lane, 541 U.S. at 531. The Court justified its conclusion that Title II is a congruent
and proportional response to violations of the right of access to the courts by highlighting
the difficulty of remedying the persistent pattern of discrimination against the disabled.
Id.
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In support of this conclusion, the Court noted the limited nature
of the remedy that Congress chose by pointing to the fact that Title II
only requires "reasonable modifications" to remove barriers blocking
access to the courts."'s The Court determined that the "reasonable
modifications" required by Title II are congruent with the due process
requirement that a state must take all practicable steps to allow every
individual the right to be heard in its courts.18 4 Consequently, accord-
ing to the Court, Title II is a congruent and proportional response to
remedy and deter the unconstitutional denial of the right of the dis-
abled to access the courts. 1 8 5 The Court, therefore, affirmed the judg-
ment of the court of appeals and concluded that Title II, as applied to
the fundamental right of access to the courts, constitutes a valid exer-
cise of Congress's Section 5 authority to enforce the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
186
Justice Souter wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Gins-
burg joined.1 87 Justice Souter noted that if the Court were to under-
take the more expansive review of Title II urged by the ChiefJustice in
his dissenting opinion, the legislative history of the ADA alone would
support Congress's abrogation of sovereign immunity with respect to
Title II of the ADA.188
Justice Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion as well, in which Jus-
tice Souter and Justice Breyer joined.189 Justice Ginsburg's concur-
rence specifically rejected the notion that Congress must gather
evidence, as if in a courtroom, to prove that a body of constitutional
violations by the states had occurred, thus necessitating prophylactic
legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 90
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion in which jus-
tice Kennedy and Justice Thomas joined. 1 ' ChiefJustice Rehnquist's
dissent rejected the Court's holding as inconsistent with the Court's
decision in Garrett as well as the principles that Garrett embodied.
19 2
183. Id. at 531-32.
184. Id. at 532.
185. Id. at 533.
186. Id. at 533-34.
187. Id. at 534 (Souter,J., concurring).
188. Id. at 534-35 (Souter, J., concurring). Specifically, Justice Souter pointed to the
evidence in the record documenting judicial endorsement of laws compelling sterilization,
indiscriminately requiring institutionalization, and prohibiting certain disabled individuals
from marrying, voting, attending public schools, and even appearing in public as evidence
of the necessity of congressional action. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
189. Id. at 535 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
190. Id. at 536 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
191. Id. at 538 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
192. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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The Chief Justice reasoned that a faithful application of the test set
forth in Boerne to Title II indicated that Title II redefines rights pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment instead of validly enforcing ex-
isting rights;' 9 3 thus, the dissent concluded that the abrogation of
sovereign immunity in Title II was unconstitutional. 94
According to the ChiefJustice, because the majority upheld Title
II as applied to the class of cases implicating access to the courts, the
proper inquiry into the legislative record developed by Congress
should be limited to instances where the states, not their subdivi-
sions,' 9 5 violated the rights of the disabled to freely access the
courts.' 96 Accordingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist examined the legisla-
tive record to determine whether Congress identified a history and
pattern of state violations of the rights of the disabled to access the
courts.197 The Chief Justice argued that the majority erroneously re-
lied on a broad accounting of society's discrimination toward the dis-
abled in the legislative record of the ADA instead of focusing on
specific instances where the states violated the constitutional rights of
the disabled to access the courts. 19 8 Furthermore, the Chief Justice
noted that the broad evidence the majority relied on was "unexam-
ined" and "anecdotal," and thus did not contain the detail necessary
to document a pattern of irrational unconstitutional conduct by the
states warranting Section 5 legislation.' 9 9
Turning to the right of access to the courts, the Chief Justice
found that there was nothing in the legislative record to indicate that
states systematically denied individuals with disabilities access to the
193. Id. at 539 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 538 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
195. Id. at 542 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). According to the Chief Justice, the Court
must discount instances of discrimination committed by the political subdivisions of a state
when reviewing abrogation because those subdivisions do not enjoy the protection of sov-
ereign immunity in the first place. Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
196. Id. at 540 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). For a listing of the rights pinpointed by the
majority, see supra note 173.
197. Lane, 541 U.S. at 541 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist stated
that this is the crucial step in the process because it identifies whether the law in question is
a legitimate attempt to remedy or prevent constitutional violations by the states or an at-
tempt to redefine the constitutional rights the law is intended to enforce. Id. (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting).
198. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). According to the Chief Justice, much of the gen-
eralized evidence taken into account by the majority was rejected in Garrett. Id. at 54142
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Moreover, the dissent noted that the Court has repeatedly
rejected evidence of constitutional violations by local government entities when con-
ducting a congruence and proportionality inquiry. Id. at 542-43 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
199. Id. at 542 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
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courts.20 0 To support this contention, the Chief Justice characterized
the evidence-purportedly documenting a pattern of state conduct
denying the disabled the right to access the courts-as anecdotal, con-
clusory, and similar to the type of evidence rejected by the Court in
Garrett.201
The Chief Justice then scrutinized Title II using the Boerne test
and determined that the legislation was neither congruent nor pro-
portional to the constitutional violations Congress intended to rem-
edy.202 According to the Chief Justice's interpretation, Congress
passed Title II to remedy discrimination in all areas of public services
without any limiting principle confining Title II to arguable constitu-
tional violations.2 1 ChiefJustice Rehnquist noted that Title II prohib-
its more state conduct than the Equal Protection Clause because it
requires the states to make reasonable modifications in virtually every
service provided by the state if those services have a disparate impact
on the disabled. 20 4 On the contrary, the Chief Justice noted that the
Equal Protection Clause prohibits the states from actions that irration-
ally discriminate against the disabled. 20 5 Therefore, the Chief Justice
argued, Title II expands the obligations of the states beyond what is
required of them under the Equal Protection Clause, and therefore is
invalid for the same reasons the Court in Garrett struck down Title 1.206
Moreover, the Chief Justice discounted the majority's reliance on
the fundamental rights protected by Title II which implicated the Due
Process Clause, because Congress did not narrowly tailor Title II to
address those rights specifically. 207 The Chief Justice noted that in-
stead of targeting those specific rights, Title II protects a broad cross
section of rights implicated by any state entity that provides services,
programs, or activities.20 8 Chief Justice Rehnquist, therefore, con-
200. Id. at 543 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 545-46 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). According to Chief Justice Rehnquist,
the only evidence that the majority pointed to that showed relevant discrimination were a
few judicial decisions that did not appear in the congressional record, a 1983 U.S. Civil
Rights Commission Report, testimony before a House subcommittee regarding the physi-
cal inaccessibility of local courthouses, and evidence submitted to Congress's designated
ADA task force supposedly containing examples documenting the exclusion of individuals
with disabilities from state services and programs. Id. at 544-45 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
202. Id. at 547-48 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 550 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 549 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 550 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
206. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
207. Id (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
208. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
2005]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
cluded that Title II is not congruent and proportional to the state
violations the majority identified, and thus is unconstitutional. 20 9
In addition, the Chief Justice argued that Title II requires states
to provide greater access to courts than required by the Due Process
Clause.210 In particular, his dissent noted that the Due Process Clause
is only violated when there is an actual denial of someone's right to
participate in a judicial proceeding.211 In comparison, the Chief Jus-
tice maintained that Title II triggers liability if the state action subjects
a disabled person to any form of discrimination, including mere in-
convenience in accessing a courthouse, which in and of itself does not
amount to a due process violation.21
2
Finally, the Chief Justice criticized the majority's examination of
the congruence and proportionality of Title II only as applied to the
due process rights cited in the majority opinion.213 The Chief Justice
stated that an as-applied approach has no place in the Court's Section
5 analysis. 214 He argued that in conducting its as-applied review of
Title II the Court created a statute that applies only to courthouses,
and that Congress never contemplated such a statute when passing
Title 11.215 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that an as-applied approach
completely deviates from past precedent, and he argued that such an
approach may have caused the Court to rule differently in prior Sec-
tion 5 cases.2 16 Moreover, the Chief Justice argued that an as-applied
approach to Section 5 legislation would allow Congress to pass broad
laws abrogating state sovereign immunity, such as Title II, leaving it to
the courts to sort out the instances in which the law is actually enforce-
able against the states.217
Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion to express his disapproval
of the use of the congruence and proportionality test to determine
what congressional legislation is appropriate under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 218 Justice Scalia declared that the test cre-
ated in Boerne invited judicial activism and improperly placed the
Court in the role of reviewing the record compiled by Congress to
209. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 553 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
211. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 554 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 551 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
214. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
215. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 551-52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 552 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). The Chief Justice worried that this ap-
proach would subject the states to substantial financial costs associated with piecemeal at-
tempts to vindicate their sovereign immunity. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 557-59 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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determine if it warranted Section 5 legislation.2 19 In its place, Justice
Scalia described a test that would limit Congress to enacting legisla-
tion through Section 5 to enforce the rights guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment and eliminate Congress's authority to enact
prophylactic measures as a means of enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment.221 Justice Scalia's new test would nonetheless continue
to apply the congruence and proportionality test to Section 5 legisla-
tion passed in response to racial discrimination, because racial dis-
crimination was the primary purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment.22
1
Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion as well, in order to
point out that he joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent because he
believed Title II is not congruent and proportional to the states' al-
leged practice of denying the disabled access to the courts.2 2 2 Justice
Thomas, however, stated that he still believed that the Court wrongly
decided Hibbs; therefore, he wrote separately to disavow any portion
of the Chief Justice's dissent that relied on that decision.
223
IV. ANALYSIS
In Tennessee v. Lane, the Supreme Court determined that Con-
gress properly abrogated state sovereign immunity pursuant to the en-
forcement provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment when it enacted
Title II of the ADA, as applied to cases implicating the fundamental
right of access to the courts.224 In upholding Title II of the ADA, the
Court for the first time incorporated an as-applied approach into its
congruence and proportionality test.225 Specifically, the Court ana-
lyzed Title II's protection of the right of access to the courts to deter-
mine if that portion of Title II was a congruent and proportional
remedy to the identified harm of general disability discrimination.226
Reviewing congressional legislation passed pursuant to Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment on an as-applied basis is necessarily
flawed. Such an approach deviates from the Court's precedent.
227
Determining congruence and proportionality in an as-applied man-
ner fundamentally weakens the Court's scrutiny of Section 5 legisla-
219. Id. at 557-58 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 558 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 563 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 565-66 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
223. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 533-34.
225. See infra notes 230-245 and accompanying text.
226. Lane, 541 U.S. at 531.
227. See infra notes 246-278 and accompanying text.
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tion because the harm identified by Congress need only be sufficient
to support abrogation in any one particular situation before the
Court.22 8 Consequently, in using an as-applied approach, the Court
will never weigh the full breadth of a congressionally enacted reme-
dial scheme against the documented harm to determine if the totality
of the remedy is congruent and proportional to the identified harm.
As a result of this new as-applied approach, the restriction placed on
Congress by the congruence and proportionality test, which ensures
that legislation passed pursuant to Section 5 actually enforces Four-
teenth Amendment rights instead of creating new legal obligations for
the states, is significantly undermined. Consequently, the states will
likely experience a significant erosion of their Eleventh Amendment
protections as Congress continues to enact broad legislation pursuant
to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 229
A. Deviating from the Boerne Analysis
In Lane, the Court took a substantially different approach in its
application of the congruence and proportionality test than its prece-
dent dictated. The majority in Lane altered the congruence and pro-
portionality test developed in Boerne by determining that Title II of the
ADA is appropriate Section 5 legislation as applied to the right of ac-
cess to the courts. 230 In creating the congruence and proportionality
test, the Supreme Court relied on the fact that the judiciary, not the
legislative branch, defines the scope of constitutional rights. 231 The
Lane decision, however, threatens to weaken this principle by allowing
Congress to structure Section 5 legislation in a way that could effec-
tively shield it from meaningful judicial review. By incorporating an
as-applied approach into the congruence and proportionality test, the
Lane Court reshaped the Boerne test such that it never examines the
totality of Section 5 legislation. Instead, the as-applied approach fo-
cuses on the specific remedy at issue in a particular case and not the
entire remedy Congress actually enacted. This approach requires a
court to determine whether the specific remedy before it is a congru-
ent and proportional response to the entire record of constitutional
violations that Congress documented, even if most of the violations
are totally unconnected to the specific constitutional right at issue in
the case at bar. Under this approach, not only is the totality of broad
Section 5 legislation shielded from review, but the specific remedy at
228. See infra notes 279-289 and accompanying text.
229. See infra notes 290-300 and accompanying text.
230. Lane, 541 U.S. at 533-34.
231. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997).
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issue in the case before the court never receives a focused inquiry to
determine if that particular remedy is congruent and proportional to
a documented pattern of states denying the specific constitutional
right at issue.
The majority in Lane correctly began the Boerne analysis by identi-
fying the rights that Congress intended to enforce through passage of
Title II of the ADA and the congressional findings that compelled
Congress to pass Title 11.232 After the Court concluded that Congress
aimed Title II at a variety of state services and that it protected a vari-
ety of constitutional rights, the majority framed the issue narrowly as
whether Congress had the authority under Section 5 to enforce the
constitutional right of access to the courts based on the broad ac-
counting of discrimination against the disabled Congress documented
when passing the entire ADA.23 3
In doing so, the Lane Court ignored the fact that Congress chose
to apply Title II broadly to all of the "services, programs, or activities"
of the states, and not just to the right of access to the courts.2 3 4 In
upholding Title II, as applied to the right of access to the courts, the
Court failed to recognize that Congress found instances of discrimina-
tion by the states against the disabled in a number of different con-
texts and chose a broad remedial scheme in order to remedy and
deter discrimination against the disabled in all of these contexts.23 5
Although Title II protects the fundamental right of access to the
courts, Congress did not tailor the legislation specifically to ensure
that the disabled had such access. 236 Instead, Congress passed the
ADA with the intention that it would create a comprehensive national
mandate to eliminate discrimination against the disabled in all its
forms.
2 3 7
Despite Congress's broad intent, the majority's as-applied ap-
proach to the congruence and proportionality test failed to determine
whether the record of discrimination by the states supported the
broad remedy chosen by Congress. 238 Based on its narrow review of
232. Lane, 541 U.S. at 522-25. The Court deviated from its holding in Garrett in its deter-
mination that the legislative record supported congressional action to remedy and deter
discrimination against the disabled. See id at 528-29. As noted previously, the dissent inter-
preted the legislative record behind the ADA in a completely different manner. Id. at 542
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
233. Id at 530-31.
234. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
235. Lane, 541 U.S. at 549 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
236. Id at 550 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
237. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1).
238. Lane, 541 U.S. at 551 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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Title II, the Court determined that Congress did not substantively
redefine the fundamental right of access to the courts because Title II
was "unquestionably" a congruent and proportional response to the
"history and pattern" of discrimination against the disabled identified
by Congress when passing the entire ADA.239 However, in coming to
this narrow conclusion, the Court never even determined whether the
instances of states denying the disabled their right to access the courts
documented by Congress supported abrogation in this limited
context.
2 4 0
Essentially, the Court's as-applied approach to the congruence
and proportionality test determined that, when stacked against the
vast record compiled by Congress, the minor step of abrogating sover-
eign immunity in the context of the right to access the courts-as op-
posed to abrogating sovereign immunity for the totality of Title II-
was an appropriate response to the history of general discrimination
against the disabled in this country.2 4 ' In effect, the Court applied
the congruence and proportionality test to a statute that Congress
never debated nor voted on.24 2 Congress did not document a wide-
spread pattern of states denying the disabled their fundamental right
to access the courts.2 4 3 Congress documented a broad general pat-
tern of state discrimination against the disabled to support broad leg-
islation to remedy that problem. 244 The Court's acceptance of the
congressional documentation as is, and its dissection of the remedy
chosen by Congress, essentially tipped the congruence and propor-
tionality test substantially in favor of upholding Congress's abrogation
of sovereign immunity. Prior to Lane, the Court applied the Boerne
test to determine whether Congress's chosen remedy taken as a whole
and applied in all possible contexts was justified by the record of un-
constitutional conduct produced by Congress.245 In contrast, the Lane
239. Id. at 531.
240. Id. at 551 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
241. This conclusion is questionable. Chief Justice Rehnquist makes a compelling case
that the congressional record did not support abrogating state sovereign immunity even in
the limited area of access to the courts. Id. at 543-48 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Accord-
ing to the ChiefJustice, if the Court analyzes a statute as applied to a particular right within
a broader statute, the Court should only look at the portion of the congressional record
that documents state violations of the particular right at issue. Id. at 542 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). The Chief Justice noted that the congressional record did not support a find-
ing that the disabled were systematically denied their rights of access to the courts. Id. at
543 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
242. Id. at 551 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
243. Id. at 541 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
244. Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
245. See supra notes 112-152 and accompanying text.
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decision allows a court to consider the entire history of unconstitu-
tional conduct documented by Congress, but instead focuses the in-
quiry on whether the remedy is justified in one specific context.
B. An As-Applied Approach Is Not Supported by Precedent
There is nothing in the Court's prior Section 5 precedent sup-
porting the Lane Court's dissection of a broad remedial statute to iso-
late the fundamental right protected therein in order to apply the
congruence and proportionality test.246 Although the majority in
Lane relied heavily on the severance of Title I of the ADA from Title II
in Garrett to support the incorporation of the as-applied approach into
the congruence and proportionality test, the Court failed to recognize
the difference between tides within a statute-which have different
remedial objectives-and provisions within one title all aimed at rem-
edying the same identified problem.247 By overlooking this differ-
ence, the majority ignored the fundamental aspect of the congruence
and proportionality test that requires the courts to review the entire
remedial scheme enacted to address the particular problem identified
by Congress.24 The problem Congress sought to address through Ti-
tle II of the ADA was discrimination against the disabled in the provi-
sion of services, programs, or activities by any public entity,24 9 whereas
Congress sought through Title I to prevent employment discrimina-
tion against the disabled.25 ° Thus, separating Title I from Title II still
allowed the Court to determine whether the differing remedial
schemes within each title were congruent and proportional to the dif-
fering harms addressed by each tide. The Lane Court's approach,
however, never allows for a determination of whether the actual rem-
edy of Title II was a congruent and proportional response to the ac-
tual objectives of Title II.
The Lane Court's as-applied approach is inconsistent with prior
Section 5 precedent where the Court applied the congruence and
proportionality test to either the entire statute or tide of the statute at
246. Brief for the United States at 39, Lane (No. 02-1667). Even the United States gov-
ernment, which argued to uphold Title II, conceded that an as-applied approach deviates
from the Court's precedent. Id. at 38-41. In fact, the United States argued that the Court
should not incorporate an as-applied approach into its Section 5 analysis as the Sixth Cir-
cuit did in Popovich. Id. Instead, the United States attempted to convince the Court to
uphold Title II of the ADA on its face. Id. at 7.
247. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 531 n.18 (noting that Garrett supports the notion that courts
need not examine Section 5 legislation all at once).
248. Id. at 551 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
249. Id. at 513.
250. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360-61 (2001).
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issue. If the Court restricted its analysis in Florida Prepaid, Kimel, and
Garrett to the specific facts in each case, the pieces of legislation at
issue may have survived the congruence and proportionality inquiry
as-applied to the particular factual circumstances of those cases. 25'
For instance, in Florida Prepaid, the Court reviewed the entire Pat-
ent Remedy Act and concluded that the Act was out of proportion to
the remedial or preventive object of the statute. 52 The Court first
pointed out the broad nature of the Patent Remedy Act, which al-
lowed private suits against a state for direct, indirect, and contributory
patent infringement. 253 The Court then struck down the Patent Rem-
edy Act because its broad remedy was not a congruent and propor-
tional response to the record of violations documented by Congress,
which did not include sufficient evidence that states were infringing
patents without due process of law. 254 The only allegations in Florida
Prepaid were that the State of Florida directly infringed on a patent
held by College Savings Bank.255 The Court, however, did not ex-
amine whether the congressional record would support abrogation as
applied to situations where states directly infringed on privately held
patents, 256 which if proven true might amount to a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, the Court focused on the totality of
the broad remedial scheme instituted by Congress and struck down
the Patent Remedy Act.25 7 Following the as-applied approach created
in Lane, the Court might have upheld the Patent Remedy Act as ap-
plied "to intentional, uncompensated patent infringements. '' 258
In Kimel, the Court struck down the abrogation provision of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act because Congress failed to
document any significant pattern of unconstitutional age discrimina-
tion by the states. 259 This led the Court to its conclusion that the
broad remedy of the ADEA was unnecessary. 260 In coming to this con-
clusion, the Court did not examine whether the limited congressional
251. Lane, 541 U.S. at 551 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
252. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 646
(1999).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 631.
256. Id. at 646-47.
257. Id. at 647-48.
258. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 552 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In par-
ticular, reviewing a portion of the means chosen by Congress makes those means appear
limited and thus more congruent and proportional to the instances of unconstitutional
conduct on the part of the states that Congress identified.
259. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000).
260. Id,
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record supported abrogation of sovereign immunity as applied to the
allegations of arbitrary age discrimination of the case at bar,26' which
if proven true would likely amount to a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Instead, the Court examined the totality of the ADEA
and struck it down as overly broad given the scarce legislative record
compiled by Congress in passing the ADEA.2 6 2 Had the Court fol-
lowed the approach set forth in Lane and restricted its review of the
ADEA as applied to the allegations of discrimination before the Court,
it is possible the Court might have determined that the scant legisla-
tive record supported abrogation as applied to arbitrary age discrimi-
nation by the states.26 3
Once more, in Garrett, the Court struck down legislation passed
pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment without deter-
mining whether the congressional record supported abrogation as ap-
plied to the allegations of the respondents that their state employers
made arbitrary discriminatory employment decisions because of their
disabilities. 264 The Court determined that Congress failed to identify
a pattern of irrational discrimination against the disabled committed
by the states in employment related decisions.265 Because of this find-
ing, the Court held that Title I did not properly abrogate sovereign
immunity. 266 Again, the Court did not examine whether the limited
legislative record supported abrogation as applied to allegations of ir-
rational employment discrimination before the Court in Garrett,
2 67
which if proven true would likely amount to a violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment. If the Court had focused only on instances of
irrational employment discrimination, it is possible the Court would
have upheld Title I of the ADA in Garrett because the limited means
reviewed by the Court would appear more congruent and propor-
tional to the legislative record than the broad means actually enacted
by Congress.268
Even in Hibbs, where the Court upheld the Family and Medical
Leave Act as a valid exercise of Congress's Section 5 power, the Court
scrutinized the totality of the means adopted by Congress to achieve
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 552 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (hypothesizing about the
possible outcome of prior Eleventh Amendment cases had Lane controlled).
264. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368-74 (2001).
265. Id. at 368.
266. Id. at 371-74.
267. Id. at 373-74.
268. Lane, 541 U.S. at 552 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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its stated purpose."' In fact, the Court determined that the legislative
history of the FMLA documented a record of unconstitutional gender
discrimination by the states.27 This finding compelled the Court to
uphold the FMLA after it determined that Congress structured the
entirety of the FMLA to narrowly address its stated objective.2 71 In
coming to this conclusion, the Court did not analyze whether the con-
gressional record supported abrogation as applied to the respondent's
allegations that the Nevada Department of Human Resources fired
the respondent in violation of the FMLA for failing to report to work
after exhausting his twelve weeks of leave mandated by the FMLA.272
Instead, the Court concluded that abrogation of sovereign immunity
was an appropriate remedy for any violation of the FMLA, and thus
the entire FMLA passed constitutional scrutiny.2 73 In fact, the major-
ity implicitly rejected an approach that would consider the particular-
ized situations of each case by discounting the dissent's analysis of
Nevada's specific leave policies.2 74 Instead, the majority focused on
the general nationwide deficiency in state leave policies regardless of
the generosity of Nevada's specific leave policies. 275
As the previous discussion indicates, the Court's application of
the Boerne test, prior to Lane, examined either a complete piece of
legislation or a complete title of a broader legislative enactment, in an
attempt to ensure that Congress was acting to remedy or deter actual
constitutional violations when it passed legislation pursuant to Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Prior to Lane, the Court applied the
Boerne test without any review of whether the identified harm war-
ranted abrogation as applied to the facts of a particular case. 2 7 6 The
incorporation of an as-applied approach into the Boerne test in Lane
without even acknowledging that such an approach alters the previous
application of the Boerne test undermines the test's legitimacy.277 Do-
ing so furthers the perception that the congruence and proportional-
269. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737-39 (2003).
270. Id. at 735.
271. Id. at 738.
272. Id. at 725.
273. Id. at 740.
274. Id at 732-34.
275. Id. at 734.
276. Id. at 727-28.
277. After the decision in Lane, broad Section 5 legislation affecting numerous rights is
more likely to pass constitutional scrutiny than Section 5 legislation that narrowly focuses
on one specific constitutional right. See infra notes 279-289 and accompanying text.
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ity test is a malleable one that is open to manipulation by judges and
offers no guidelines for Congress or the states to follow.
2 78
C. An As-Applied Approach Circumvents the Restrictions of the Boerne
Test
The Lane Court's application of the Boerne test to only a portion
of such a broad law makes it virtually impossible for the Court to de-
termine if the remedy chosen by Congress was a congruent and pro-
portional response to the identified harm and thus within Congress's
constitutional authority. The vigorous application of the congruence
and proportionality test to either an entire section or piece of legisla-
tion allows the Court to determine if Congress was taking remedial
measures for past wrongs or imposing new legal obligations on the
states and thus exceeding its Section 5 authority.279 The Lane Court's
decision undercuts the basis for the Boerne test. For instance, without
a forceful application of the Boerne test, the incentives the Court
sought to place on Congress so it would not pass broad statutes abro-
gating state sovereign immunity pursuant to Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment are virtually gone.28 0  Congress can now pass
broad legislation affecting a wide variety of rights knowing that the
courts will sort through the statute on a case-by-case basis to deter-
mine what situations exhibit congruence and proportionality to the
identified harm.2"' Accordingly, allowing Congress this authority
places the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in doubt because
the states must defend their sovereign immunity in court multiple
times for one piece of legislation.282 This conflicts with the notion
that the states enjoy jurisdictional immunity from suit altogether pur-
suant to the Eleventh Amendment.28 Consequently, states will have
to struggle to vindicate their sovereign immunity in the years ahead as
litigation arises from the other rights protected by Title II.
278. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 557-58 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
congruence and proportionality test as an "invitation to judicial arbitrariness and policy-
driven decisionmaking").
279. J. Randy Beck, The Heart of Federalism: Pretext Review of Means-End Relationships, 36
U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 407, 440 (2003).
280. Lane, 541 U.S. at 552 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
281. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
282. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (describing the increased amount of litigation
the Lane decision will cause the states when attempting to defend their sovereign
immunity).
283. See P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146-47
(1993) (noting that the essence of the Eleventh Amendment is to prohibit the states from
being subjected to the judicial process at the insistence of a private party).
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The Lane Court's incorporation of an as-applied approach into
the congruence and proportionality test eases the requirement placed
on Congress to draft legislation enacted pursuant to the enforcement
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment in a way that would specifi-
cally target enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment guaran-
tees. z84 This, in turn, allows Congress to expand the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 285 In fact, the as-applied approach adopted
in Lane encourages Congress, when contemplating passing Section 5
legislation, to document instances of discrimination in a wide variety
of areas affecting numerous constitutional rights and then enact
broad prophylactic legislation implicating all of those constitutional
rights.2 86 The precedent set in Lane encourages this approach be-
cause the Court accepts the historical documentation of discrimina-
tion in its entirety, but determines whether the means chosen by
Congress are congruent and proportional to the documented harm
on a case-by-case basis.2 7 As discussed above, reviewing the legislation
in this manner makes the means chosen by Congress appear limited
and thus more likely to pass the congruence and proportionality
test.288 Accordingly, instituting an as-applied approach to the congru-
ence and proportionality test has the potential to nullify the limita-
tions placed on Congress by the Court's recent Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence. 28 1
D. Weakening the Congruence and Proportionality Test Dilutes the States'
Eleventh Amendment Protections
Sovereign immunity protects the states from unnecessary federal
intrusion and ensures that the states will maintain authority over the
difficult decisions associated with distributing their limited re-
sources.2 "' The Lane Court's incorporation of an as-applied analysis
into the congruence and proportionality test greatly expands the au-
284. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 552 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the congruence
and proportionality inquiry can only be answered by measuring the breadth of the statute
against the record of unconstitutional conduct that Congress sought to remedy); Nev.
Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 758-59 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(describing the difference between legislation enacted to enforce existing rights and legis-
lation enacted to place new substantive obligations on the states).
285. Lane, 541 U.S. at 552 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
286. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 746 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
287. Lane, 541 U.S. at 541 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
288. See id. at 551 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (noting that the as-applied approach rigs
the congruence and proportionality test in a way that makes purportedly remedial laws
more likely to pass constitutional scrutiny).
289. Id. at 552 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
290. See supra notes 61-84 and accompanying text.
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thority of Congress to create broad remedial schemes to address per-
ceived constitutional violations, thus decreasing the protections that
the states maintain from their sovereign immunity. An as-applied ap-
proach to the Boerne test makes the remedy chosen by Congress ap-
pear limited because courts may overlook the true breadth of the
actual statute. The appearance of a limited remedy increases the like-
lihood that a court will determine that the chosen remedy is a congru-
ent and proportional response to the harm documented by Congress
because the documentation need only support one portion of a
broader statutory scheme. 291' Furthermore, determining whether con-
gressional legislation redefines the rights protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment requires examining the entire remedial objectives at is-
sue against the scope of the constitutional rights the legislation in-
tends to enforce.292 Restricting the scope of the statute to a clearly
defined constitutional right within a broad statute makes the congru-
ence and proportionality inquiry a mere formality. Allowing this goes
against the Court's recent Fourteenth Amendment precedent, which
required Congress to narrowly target legislation enacted pursuant to
Section 5, to address a documented pattern of unconstitutional con-
duct on the part of the states.2"' This allows Congress to invade the
autonomy of the states and further interfere with their governing au-
thority. The decision in Lane undermines the notion, stressed by the
Court in creating the congruence and proportionality test, that this
test ensures that Congress does not pass legislation authorizing suits
against the states through Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as
a pretext to substantively redefine the obligations placed on the states
by the Fourteenth Amendment.294
By weakening the congruence and proportionality test, the Lane
Court gives Congress greater leeway to redefine the obligations placed
on the states, which in turn blurs the line of accountability a state has
towards its own citizens and thus weakens the state's Eleventh Amend-
ment protection.295 In particular, states could face numerous suits
stemming from a single piece of legislation, which compromises the
immunity from suit that the states maintain from the Eleventh
Amendment.29 6 Additionally, if the states must litigate each claim
291. Lane, 541 U.S. at 551-52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
292. See id. at 530 (summarizing petitioner's argument that Title II's broad applications
should be examined all at once).
293. Id. at 551 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
294. Id. at 539 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
295. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 744 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
296. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996); P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer
Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993).
2005]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
arising out of Section 5 legislation as applied to the particular facts of
each case, the value of Eleventh Amendment sovereignty diminishes
significantly. This situation will require states to attempt to vindicate
their sovereign immunity in an incremental fashion, which places a
severe drain on their treasuries. 97 Consequently, the Lane Court's as-
applied approach poses a problem for the autonomy of the states, be-
cause determining how to distribute a state's fiscal resources is an at-
tribute that is fundamental to sovereignty.298 If the states are to
maintain their representative function, these difficult decisions must
be made through the normal legislative process and not imposed on
the states by the federal government unless necessary to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment. 29 9 Consequently, courts should aggressively
resolve abrogation questions as early as possible to protect the total
immunity from suit that the states are entitled to.3 °° The Lane deci-
sion, however, opens the states to numerous suits stemming from a
complex piece of congressional legislation before the abrogation
question is ultimately determined conclusively.
V. CONCLUSION
In Tennessee v. Lane, the Supreme Court held that Title II of the
ADA, as applied to cases implicating the fundamental right of access
to the courts, constitutes a valid exercise of Congress's Section 5 en-
forcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment. °1 In uphold-
ing Title II as applied to the right of access to the courts, the Court
altered the congruence and proportionality test by incorporating an
as-applied approach into its analysis. 0 2 The Court's prior Section 5
precedent does not support an as-applied approach to the application
of the congruence and proportionality test.30 3 This approach in-
creases the likelihood that Congress will continue to enact broad legis-
lation through its Fourteenth Amendment powers, which contradicts
the recent trend by the Court to attempt to narrow Congress's Section
297. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749-51 (1999) (noting the implications of merely
being sued on a state's treasury).
298. Id.
299. Id. at 751.
300. See P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 506 U.S. at 147 (holding that parties may immedi-
ately appeal Eleventh Amendment immunity rulings regardless of whether further factual
development may be necessary to determine the connection between the state and a seem-
ingly independent organization).
301. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004).
302. See supra notes 230-245 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 246-278 and accompanying text.
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5 authority.304 Expanding Congress's Section 5 authority necessarily
threatens to weaken state sovereign immunity.30 5 The Court should
have adhered to the principle set forth in Boerne and reviewed Tide II
of the ADA in its entirety, thus, fully respecting both the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity main-
tained by the states.
MICHAEL J. NEARY
304. See supra notes 279-289 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 290-300 and accompanying text.
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